Secret-sharing schemes are a tool used in many cryptographic protocols. In these schemes, a dealer holding a secret string distributes shares to the parties such that only authorized subsets of participants can reconstruct the secret from their shares. The collection of authorized sets is called an access structure. An access structure is ideal if there is a secret-sharing scheme realizing it such that the shares are taken from the same domain as the secrets. Brickell and Davenport (J. of Cryptology, 1991) have shown that ideal access structures are closely related to matroids. They give a necessary condition for an access structure to be ideal -the access structure must be induced by a matroid. Seymour (J. of Combinatorial Theory B, 1992) showed that the necessary condition is not sufficient: There exists an access structure induced by a matroid that does not have an ideal scheme.
Introduction
Secret sharing schemes are a tool used in many cryptographic protocols. A secret sharing scheme involves a dealer who has a secret, a finite set of n participants, and a collection A of subsets of the set of participants called the access structure. A secret-sharing scheme for A is a method by which the dealer distributes shares to the parties such that: (1) any subset in A can reconstruct the secret from its shares, and (2) any subset not in A cannot reveal any partial information about the secret in the information theoretic sense. A secret sharing scheme can only exist for monotone access structures, i.e. if a subset A can reconstruct the secret, then every superset of A can also reconstruct the secret. Given any monotone access structure, Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki [24] show how to build a secret sharing scheme realizing the access structure. Even with more efficient schemes presented since, e.g. in [6, 44, 12, 27, 47, 23] , most access structures require shares of exponential size: even if the domain of the secrets is binary, the shares are strings of length 2 Θ(n) , where n is the number of participants.
Certain access structures give rise to very economical secret sharing schemes. A secret sharing scheme is called ideal if the shares are taken from the same domain as the secrets. For example, Shamir's threshold secret sharing scheme [43] is ideal. An access structure is called ideal if there is an ideal secret sharing scheme which realizes the access structure over some finite domain of secrets. Ideal access structures are interesting for a few reasons: (1) they have the most efficient secret sharing schemes as proved by [28] , (2) they are most suitable for composition of secret sharing schemes, and (3) they have interesting combinatorial structure, namely, they have a matroidial structure, as proved by [13] and discussed in the next paragraph.
Brickell and Davenport [13] have shown that ideal access structures are closely related to matroids over a set containing the participants and the dealer. They give a necessary condition for an access structure to be ideal -the access structure must be induced by a matroid -and a somewhat stronger sufficient conditionthe matroid should be representable over some finite field. The question of an exact characterization of ideal access structures is still open. Seymour [42] has shown that the necessary condition is not sufficient: there exists an access structure induced by a matroid that does not have an ideal scheme. Matúš [34] has shown that access structures induced by several other matroids do not not have ideal schemes. The following natural open question arises: How far from ideal can access structures induced by matroids be? Is there an upper-bound on the shares' size implied by being an access structure induced by a matroid? There is no better known upper bound on the share size than the 2 O(n) bound for general access structures. Most known secret sharing schemes are linear (see discussion in Section 1.2). On one hand, the number of linear schemes with n participants, binary domain of secrets, and shares of size poly(n) is 2 poly(n) . On the other hand, the number of matroids with n points is exp(2 Θ(n) ) (see [50] ) and every matroid induces exactly one access structure. Thus, for most access structures induced by matroids, the size of the shares in linear secretsharing schemes with binary domain is super-polynomial. This gives some evidence that access structures induced by matroids do not have efficient secret sharing schemes for a reasonable size of domain of secrets.
Our Results
In this work we continue the research on access structures induced by matroids. Seymour [42] showed that any access structure induced by the Vamos matroid [49] is not ideal. Our main result is strengthening this result. We consider an access structure induced by the Vamos matroid and show that in any secret sharing scheme realizing this access structure with domain of the secret of size k, the size of the domain of the shares is at least k + Ω( √ k) (compared to the lower bound of k + 1 implied by [42] ). We first give a somewhat simpler proof of Seymour's result, and then strengthen it. Towards proving this stronger lower bound, we needed to strengthen some results of [13] to non-ideal secret sharing schemes realizing access structures induced by matroids. We then needed to generalize Seymour's ideas to obtain our lower bound. The best secret sharing scheme realizing the access structure induced by the Vamos matroid was recently presented by Martí-Farré and Padró [31] ; in this scheme the size of the domain of shares is k 3/2 . Thus, our work still leaves open the question of the minimal-size share domain for this access structure.
Brickell and Davenport [13] proved that the size of the domain of shares of a subset of participants in an ideal scheme is exactly determined by the size of the domain of secrets and the rank of the subset in the matroid inducing the access structure. We consider non-ideal secret sharing schemes realizing access structures induced by matroids. We prove that the fact that an access structure is induced by a matroid implies lower and upper bounds on the size of the domain of shares of subsets of participants even in nonideal schemes. These lower and upper bounds, beside being interesting for their own, are used to prove our main result. We need both the lower bounds and the upper bounds to prove our main result -the lower bound on the size of the domain of shares in the Vamos matroid.
We prove two incomparable versions of such bounds. The first version, in Section 3, contains somewhat weaker bounds; however, this is the version we can use in the proof of our main result. The second version, in Section 5, contains bounds on the entropy of shares of subsets of participants. Entropy arguments have been used to give bounds on the size of shares in secret sharing schemes starting with [28, 15] . Specifically, entropy arguments have been used for ideal secret sharing schemes in [29] . We were not able to use the bounds we proved via entropy in the proof of our main result for technical reasons. We include them in this paper since we believe that they are interesting for their own sake. Furthermore, they might be useful in proving stronger bounds than the lower bound proved here, either for the matroid induced by the Vamos matroid, or for access structures induced by other matroids. See discussion in Example 5.11.
Finally, we present an example of a non-ideal access structure induced by a matroid, which is nearly ideal: for infinitely many values of k it has a secret sharing scheme realizing it with domain of secrets of size k and domain of shares of size k + 1. This implies that the definition used in [32, 30, 35] for ideal schemes is not equivalent to the more common definition of ideal schemes used implicitly in [13] and explicitly in [33, 1, 37, 38, 3] and in this work.
We remark that our results in this paper are related to an open problem of Martí-Farré and Padró [30, 32] :
Question 1 Does there exist an access structure whose optimal maximal share size is O(k α ) for some constant 1 < α < 1.5.
By a recent result of [31] , such access structure must have an appropriate matroid as in every secret sharing scheme realizing an access structure that does not have an appropriate matroid the size of the domain of shares of at least one participant is at least k 1.5 .
Related Works
Secret sharing schemes were first introduced by Blakley [8] and Shamir [43] for the threshold case, that is, for the case where the subsets that can reconstruct the secret are all the sets whose cardinality is at least a certain threshold. Secret sharing schemes for general access structures were introduced by Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki in [24] . More efficient schemes were presented in, e.g., [6, 44, 12, 27, 47, 23] . Originally motivated by the problem of secure information storage, secret-sharing schemes have found numerous other applications in cryptography and distributed computing, e.g., Byzantine agreement [41] , secure multiparty computations [5, 16, 18] , threshold cryptography [21] , and access control [36] . Several lower bounds on the share size of secret-sharing schemes were obtained [6, 15, 9, 22, 20, 19] . The strongest current bound is Ω(n 2 / log n) [19] for the total size of the shares of all the participants, where n is the number of participants in the access structure. However, there is a huge gap between these lower bounds and the best known upper bounds of 2 O(n) for general access structures. The question of superpolynomial lower bounds on the size of shares for some (explicit or random) access structures is still open.
Ideal secret sharing schemes and ideal access structures, considered in this work, have been studied extensively. Brickell [12] was the first to introduce the notion of ideal access structures. He has shown that if an access structure is induced by a matroid representable over some finite field, then the access structure is ideal. In particular, he designed ideal secret sharing schemes for multilevel access structures, and for compartmented access structures (Tassa [48] constructed explicit ideal secret sharing schemes for these access structures). Brickell and Davenport [13] have shown that ideal access structures are closely related to matroids over a set containing the participants and the dealer, and, as elaborated above, give necessary and sufficient conditions for an access structure to be ideal (see also [33] ).
However, there is still a gap between these conditions: Seymour [42] has shown that the necessary condition of [13] is not sufficient, by showing that the access structure induced by the Vamos matroid does not have an ideal scheme. Simonis and Ashikhmin [45] give a more geometric proof of this result. Matúš [34] has shown that ideal schemes are closely related to the solutions of a system of generalized quasigroup equations associated to the matroid inducing the access structure. Using this relation, Matúš has shown that access structures induced by several other matroids (including the nonDesargues matroids and matroids that contain as restriction both the Fano and nonFano matroids) do not not have ideal schemes.
Kurosawa et al. [29] studied the connection between non-perfect secret sharing schemes and matroids. Beimel and Chor [1] characterized universally ideal access structures, that is, access structures that are ideal over every finite domain of secrets. As an intermediate step, they proved that an access structure is ideal over a binary domain (respectively, ternary domain) of secrets if and only if it is induced by a matroid representable over GF(2) (respectively, GF(3)). Jackson, Martin, and O'Keefe [26] considered ideal secret sharing schemes with multiple secrets. Simonis and Ashikhmin [45] define almost affine codes, which can be viewed as a matrix such that there exists an integer q and any restriction of the columns of the matrix yields a sub-matrix with q i distinct rows, for some integer i. They show that almost affine codes are essentially ideal secret sharing schemes. Ng and Walker [38] defined the strong connectivity equivalence relation, and have shown that under this equivalence relation an ideal secret sharing scheme decomposes into threshold schemes. They have given a necessary condition for an access structure to be ideal for the case when the number of equivalence classes is two. Ng [37] proved that this condition is sufficient too.
As there is no exact characterization of ideal access structures, ideal access structures were characterized for particular families of access structures: access structures on sets of four participants [46] and five participants [25] , access structures in which the minimal authorized sets are of size 2 (called graph access structures) [10] , bipartite access structures [40] , access structures with three or four minimal subsets [30] , access structures with intersection number equal to one [32] , and weighted threshold access structures [3] (special cases of ideal weighted access structures were characterized in [35] ). Recently, Martí-Farré and Padró [31] (generalizing results of [46, 25, 10, 40, 30, 32] ) have shown that in any non-matroidial accessstructure, there is at least one participant whose share domain size is at least k 1.5 , where k is the size of the domain of secrets.
Most previously known secret-sharing schemes were linear. In a linear scheme, the secret is viewed as an element of a finite field, and the shares are obtained by applying a linear mapping to the secret and several independent random field elements. For example, the schemes of [43, 8, 24, 6, 44, 7, 27] are all linear, and the ideal schemes implied by the sufficient condition of [12, 13] are linear. A generalization of linear schemes are multi-linear schemes of van Dijk [23] , where the secret is a vector of elements from a finite field, and the shares are obtained by applying a linear mapping to the coordinates of a vector representing the secret and several independent random field elements. Simonis and Ashikhmin [45] have given an example of an access structure that has an ideal multi-linear secret sharing scheme, but does not have an ideal linear secret sharing scheme. Beimel and Ishai [2] discuss compositions of linear schemes over different fields, which they call quasi-linear schemes. Beimel and Weinreb [4] prove that there are quasi-linear schemes that are super-polynomially more efficient than linear schemes. The only known secret sharing schemes that are neither multi-linear nor quasi-linear are presented in [2] ; however these schemes are not ideal.
Organization. In Section 2 we present basic definitions of secret sharing schemes and matroids, and discuss the relations between them. In Section 3 we we prove some technical lemmas concerning weak secret sharing schemes; these lemmas are used to prove our main result. In Section 4 we first reprove the known result that any access structure induced by the Vamos matroid is non-ideal, and then strengthen this result. In Section 5 we prove upper and lower bounds on the entropy of shares of subsets of participants in secret sharing schemes realizing matroid induced access structures. Finally, in Section 6 we give an example of a non-ideal access structure that is nearly ideal.
Preliminaries
In this section we define secret sharing schemes, review some background on matroids, and discuss the connection between secret sharing schemes and matroids.
Secret Sharing
Definition 2.1 (Access Structure) Let P be a finite set of participants. A collection A ⊆ 2 P is monotone if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C imply that C ∈ A. An access structure is a monotone collection A ⊆ It is important to stress that the description of the scheme, namely, {M s } s∈K , {Π s } s∈K , is public knowledge. The uncertainty that an unauthorized subset of participants has about the secret is an outcome of the uncertainty of the dealer's choice of the row r ∈ M s .
Sometimes it is convenient to represent {M s } s∈K as one matrix M , defined as follows
We think of the left-most column of M as the dealer's column, and denote it p 0 . For any A ⊆ P , denote by K(A) the set of distinct rows in the restriction of M to the columns in A. That is, K(A) is the set of combinations of shares the participants in A can receive. Given K A , denote by K(p 0 |K A ) the possible values of the secret given that the participants in A receive the vector of shares K A .
Definition 2.3 (Secret Sharing Scheme)
We say that a distribution scheme Σ is a secret sharing scheme realizing an access structure A ⊆ 2 P if the following two requirements hold: 
CORRECTNESS. The secret s can be reconstructed by any authorized set of participants. That is, for any
Pr
where the rows r 1 and and r 2 are chosen from the probability distributions Π s 1 and Π s 2 respectively, and
is the restriction of the row r j in M s i to the columns in A.
Sometimes we will denote the domain of secrets by K(p 0 ), the share domain of the dealer. However, the dealer is not a participant.
Example 2.4
As an example for our definitions, we consider Shamir's threshold scheme [43] . Denote P = {1, . . . , n}, let t ≤ n, and define the access structure A t = {A ⊆ P : |A| ≥ t}. We choose some prime number q ≥ n, and define a secret sharing scheme with domain of secrets of size q as follows. In order to distribute a secret s ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, the dealer randomly chooses, with uniform distribution, a polynomial p of degree t − 1 over GF(q) such that p(0) = s. The dealer then distributes to each participant p i ∈ P the share p(i). When an authorized subset of participants (of size at least t) wants to reconstruct the secret, it has at least t distinct points of the polynomial p of degree t − 1, therefore, it can determine p, and it can calculate p(0). If an unauthorized subset of participants -a subset of cardinality less than t -wants to reconstruct the secret, then for any s ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} there is an equal number of polynomials through the points given to the participants and the point (0, s). Thus, this unauthorized subset has no information about the secret. In such a scheme, for each secret s ∈ GF(q), the matrix M s contains q t−1 rows; a row p(1), . . . , p(n) for every polynomial p of degree t − 1 over GF(q) such that p(0) = s. The matrix M contains q t rows, a row for every polynomial p of degree t − 1 over GF(q). The distribution Π s is the uniform distribution on the rows of M s .
Karnin et al. [28] show that the size of the domain of shares of each participant is at least the size of the domain of secrets. This motivates the definition of ideal secret sharing.
Definition 2.5 (Ideal Secret Sharing Scheme and Ideal Access Structure) A secret-sharing scheme with domain of secrets K is ideal if the domain of shares of each user is K. An access structure A is k-ideal if there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme realizing it with domain of secrets
We next give a relaxed definition of secret sharing scheme, which we call a weak secret sharing scheme. In a weak secret sharing scheme, a weaker condition for privacy is required. While in the previous definition it is required that the uncertainty of the secret given the shares of an unauthorized subset of participants is the same as the a-priory uncertainty of the secret (in the information theoretic sense), here we require merely that no value of the secret could be ruled out, i.e., that each value of the secret has probability greater than zero. Definition 2.6 (Weak Secret-Sharing Scheme and Weakly Ideal Access Structure) Let P be a set of participants, and let K be a finite set of secrets. A weak secret sharing scheme with domain of secrets K is a matrix M whose columns are indexed by P ∪ {p 0 }, where p 0 / ∈ P , and with all entries in column p 0 from K.
We say that M realizes a weak secret sharing scheme for the access structure A ⊆ 2 P if the following two requirements hold:
CORRECTNESS. The secret can be reconstructed by any authorized set of participants, that is, for any
A ∈ A and
WEAK PRIVACY. Given a vector of shares of an unauthorized set of participants, none of the values of the secret can be ruled out. That is, for any
If an access structure has a weak secret sharing scheme with shares' domain equal to the domain of the secret for some finite domain of secrets, we say that the access structure is weakly ideal.
Remark 2.7
If Σ = {M s } s∈K , {Π s } s∈K is a secret sharing scheme and M is defined as in (1), then M is a weak secret sharing scheme. That is, every secret sharing scheme implies a weak secret sharing scheme. Thus, in Section 4 we prove lower bounds on the size of shares in weak secret sharing schemes.
We next give some notations concerning weak secret sharing schemes. Given A, B ⊆ P ∪ {p 0 } and K B ∈ K(B), denote by K(A|K B ) the set of combinations of shares the participants in A can receive given that the participants in B received the vector of shares K B . That is, if M ′ is the restriction of M to the rows such that the values in the columns in B are K B , then K(A|K B ) is the set of the distinct rows in the restriction of M ′ to the columns in A. We say that K A coincides with K B if K A ∈ K(A|K B ) (that is, there is a row in M that gives to the participants in A the shares in K A and to the participants in B the shares in K B ). Of course, this relation is symmetric. We denote
Given sets of participants A, B 1 , . . . , B ℓ ⊆ V , and vectors of shares K B i ∈ K(B i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, we also denote K(A|K B 1 , . . . , K B ℓ ) as the set of vectors of shares the (ordered) set of participants A can receive given that the participants of B i received the shares K B i for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Given two sets of participants A, B ⊆ V , and a set X B ⊆ K(B) we denote
Throughout the paper it will be clear from the context to what columns (participants) does the conditioning value K B in the notation K(A|K B ) refer to.
Matroids
A matroid is an axiomatic abstraction of linear independence. There are several equivalent axiomatic systems to describe matroids: by independent sets, by bases, by the rank function, or, as done here, by circuits. For more background on matroid theory the reader is referred to [50, 39] .
Definition 2.8 (Matroid)
A matroid M = V, C is a finite set V and a collection C of subsets of V that satisfy the following three axioms:
The elements of V are called points, or simply elements, and the subsets in C are called circuits.
For example, let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph and C be the collection of simple cycles in G. Then, (E, C) is a matroid.
Definition 2.9 (Rank, Independent and Dependent Sets)
, is the size of a maximal independent subset of A.
The following lemma shows that a stronger statement than (C2) can be made about the circuits of a matroid. Its proof can be found, e.g., in [50] . The following lemma, whose proof can be found in [50, 39] , states that if a matroid is connected then the set of circuits through a fixed point uniquely determines the matroid.
Lemma 2.12
Let e be an element of a connected matroid M and let C e be the set of circuits of M that contain e. For C 1 , C 2 ∈ C e define:
Then, all of the circuits of M that do not contain e are the minimal sets of the form D e (C 1 , C 2 ), where C 1 and C 2 are distinct circuits in C e .
The following example demonstrates this lemma.
Example 2.13 Let M = V, C be a matroid, with V = {a, b, c, d, e} and
Thus, C e = {{a, d, e} , {a, b, c, e}} . Consider the circuit {b, c, d}, which does not contain e. Then this circuit is obtained by calculating
and then D e ({a, d, e} , {a, b, c, e}) = {a, b, c, d, e} \ {a, e} = {b, c, d} .
Matroids and Secret Sharing
Definition 2.14 Let M = V, C be a matroid and p 0 ∈ V . The induced access structure of M with respect to p 0 is the access structure A on P = V \ {p 0 }, where A corollary of Lemma 2.12 is that if an access structure has an appropriate matroid, then this matroid is unique. Of course, not every access structure has an appropriate matroid. If a connected access structure has an appropriate matroid, then this matroid is also connected.
That is, a set A is a minterm of
We now quote some results concerning weak secret sharing schemes. Since every secret sharing scheme is, in particular, a weak secret sharing scheme, these results hold for the regular case as well. The following fundamental result, which is proved in [13] , connects matroids and secret sharing schemes.
Theorem 2.15 ([13])
If an access structure is weakly ideal, then it has an appropriate matroid.
Remark 2.16
As mentioned above, by Lemma 2.12 the appropriate matroid is unique.
The following result, which is implicit in [13] , shows the connection between the rank function of the appropriate matroid and the size of the domain of shares of sets of participants.
Lemma 2.17 ([13])
Assume that the access structure A ⊆ 2 P is weakly ideal, and let P ∪ {p 0 } , C be its appropriate matroid where p 0 / ∈ P . Let M be an ideal weak secret sharing scheme realizing A with domain of secrets (and shares) K. Then |K(X)| = |K| rank(X) for any X ⊆ P ∪ {p 0 }, where rank(X) is the rank of X in the matroid.
Remark 2.18
By Lemma 2.17, if M realizes a weakly ideal secret sharing scheme for A, then M realizes an ideal secret sharing scheme for A, where the dealer chooses the random row with uniform distribution. That is, any weakly ideal secret sharing scheme induces an ideal secret sharing scheme. For every s ∈ K define M s as the set of rows of M where the value of p 0 is s, restricted to P , and Π s as the uniform distribution on the rows of M s .
Remark 2.19
Another corollary of Lemma 2.17 is that M can realize a secret sharing scheme for any access structure induced from M (i.e., with every element set as the dealer). Example 2.20 Consider the threshold access structure A t and Shamir's scheme [43] realizing it (see Example 2.
4).
The appropriate matroid of A t is the matroid with n + 1 points, whose circuits are the sets of size t + 1 and rank(X) = min {|X|, t}. Since every t points determine a unique polynomial of degree t − 1, in Shamir's scheme |K(X)| = |K| min{|X|,t} , as implied by Lemma 2.17.
Secret Sharing Schemes Realizing Matroid-Induced Access Structures
We now prove some lemmas concerning weak secret sharing schemes and matroid-induced access structures with arbitrary size of shares domain. In the rest of this section, denote the dealer p 0 , and define K is the domain of secrets) .
The next lemma, which will be used throughout this paper, gives a lower bound on the size of the shares of certain subsets of participants. This lemma holds for every access structure. Lemma 3.1 Let A ⊆ 2 P be an access structure, A, B ⊆ P , and b ∈ B \ A such that A ∪ B ∈ A and
Proof: Since A ∪ B \ {b} is unauthorized, by (5), for any K A∪B\{b} ∈ K(A ∪ B \ {b}),
Since A ∪ B is authorized, by (4), for any
Furthermore, for any K A∪B\{b} ∈ K(A ∪ B \ {b}),
Since, by (7), every set in this union is of size one, and since, by (6) , the size of the union is |K|, there are at least |K| sets in the union. Hence |K(b|K A∪B\{b} )| ≥ |K|. Define K A as the restriction of the vector K A∪B\{b} to the shares of the participants in A. Since K(b|K A∪B\{b} ) ⊆ K(b|K A ), the lemma follows. 2 Lemma 3.2 Let M = P ∪ {p 0 } , C be the appropriate matroid of an access structure A ⊆ 2 P , and let In the ideal case, by Lemma 2.17, we get an upper bound on the share domain of every subset of participants that form a circuit in the appropriate matroid (including circuits that do not contain the dealer). In the non-ideal case we cannot apply Lemma 2.17. Lemma 3.4 will be used to overcome this difficulty. To prove Lemma 3.4, we need the following claim.
Claim 3.3 Let
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume K = {1, 2, . . . , k}.
since both these sums are the size of the domains of the functions. Moreover, since both these functions are onto K, we have a i ≥ 1 and
Assume without loss of generality that a 1 is maximal in a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k . Then,
Figure 1: Sets in the proof of Theorem 4.4. Circles denote sets, and points denote elements in the sets. Two elements are connected if they coincide. A line connects an element and a subset, if the subset is the set of all elements that coincide with the element, within the set the subset is in. For example, x1, x2 and A are connected with lines because A is the set of elements in K(v5, v6) that can coincide with x1, x2 . Likewise, A and E are connected, because for every element in A, the set E is the set of elements in K(v7, v8) it can coincide with, and vice versa.
(1) The set {v 3 
The Vamos Access Structure is Non-Ideal
The following theorem is the main result in [42] . The proof we present here is somewhat simpler than the proof in [42] . In Section 4.2 we strengthen this result; the purpose of presenting this proof is to explain the ideas of the stronger result. 2 The idea of the proof is as follows. Assume towards contradiction that there is an ideal (weak) secret sharing scheme realizing V 8 . The rank of {v 1 , v 2 , v 7 , v 8 } in the Vamos matroid is 4, thus, by Lemma 2.17, the size of the domain of shares of
However, we will prove that from restrictions implied by Lemma 2.17, for every
Theorem 4.4 The access structure V 8 is non-ideal.
Proof: Assume towards contradiction that the access structure V 8 has an ideal secret sharing scheme. In particular, it has a weakly ideal secret sharing scheme. Let M be a matrix, with entries from K, realizing it. Fix arbitrary x 1 , x 2 ∈ K(v 1 , v 2 ), and define
(for an illustration see Figure 1 ). Furthermore, fix arbitrary x 3 , x 4 ∈ K(v 3 , v 4 |x 1 , x 2 ) and define
The outline of the proof is as follows. We will show that A = B, and |A| = |K|. Define
By symmetric arguments, E is the set K(v 7 , v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ) for any y 5 , y 6 ∈ A, therefore K(v 7 , v 8 |A) = E. That is, the possible shares of v 7 , v 8 given that the shares of v 5 , v 6 are in A, are exactly the possible shares of v 7 , v 8 given that the shares of v 3 , v 4 are the fixed shares x 3 , x 4 . Furthermore, by symmetric arguments |E| = |K|. The set K(v 7 , v 8 |x 1 , x 2 ) is contained in the set K(v 7 , v 8 |A), and thus, |K(v 7 , v 8 |x 1 , x 2 )| ≤ |K|. Since |K(v 1 , v 2 )| = |K| 2 , this leads to a contradiction.
We proceed to the formal proof. By Lemma 2.17,
By symmetry, for every
and for every y 3 ,
Since rank(v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 ) = 4, by Lemma 2.17,
By (8) and (9), |K(v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 |y 1 , y 2 )| ≤ |K| 2 for every y 1 , y 2 ∈ K 2 . Since K(v 1 , v 2 ) = K 2 , Equation (11) implies that equality holds here, that is, |K(v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 |y 1 , y 2 )| = |K| 2 for every y 1 , y 2 ∈ K 2 . Thus, for every y 1 , y 2 ∈ K(v 1 , v 2 ), every y 3 , y 4 ∈ K(v 3 , v 4 |y 1 , y 2 ), and every y 5 , y 6 ∈ K(v 5 , v 6 |y 1 , y 2 ), we have y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , y 6 ∈ K(v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 |y 1 , y 2 ). That is, if given y 1 , y 2 the vectors y 3 , y 4 and y 5 , y 6 are possible shares for {v 3 , v 4 } and {v 5 , v 6 } respectively, then y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , y 6 is a possible vector of shares for {v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 } given y 1 , y 2 . In particular, since x 3 , x 4 ∈ K(v 3 , v 4 |x 1 , x 2 ),
Since, by (9) and (10), both these sets are of size |K|, we conclude that A = B.
Denote 
Stronger Bounds on the Vamos Access Structure
For a given secret sharing scheme realizing V 8 , assume |K(v 8 )| = k, and |K(v i )| ≤ m for 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, i.e., the size of the domain of the secrets is k and the size of the domain of the shares of each participant is upper bounded by m. By [28] , for every secret sharing scheme, the size of the domain of shares of each non-redundant participant is at least the size of the domain of secrets, that is, m ≥ k. In the previous section we proved that m ≥ k + 1. That is, the access structure is not ideal. We now prove a stronger lower bound on m.
The framework of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4, but because we allow the size of the domain of the shares to be larger than k, we have to consider some more details. There are two main difficulties we have to consider. First, Lemma 2.17 does not apply to non-ideal schemes. Instead, we use Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 to bound the cardinality of the domain of the shares. Second, sets that in the previous proof were equal, due to cardinality constraints, are not necessarily equal here. Instead, we will show a large intersection between them. To achieve the lower bound on m here, we fix an arbitrary x 1 , x 2 ∈ K(v 1 , v 2 ) and calculate an upper bound on the size of K(v 7 , v 8 |x 1 , x 2 ) as a function of m and k. By Lemma 3.2 the size of this set is at least k 2 , and thus we achieve a lower bound on m.
Fix some arbitrary x 1 , x 2 ∈ K(v 1 , v 2 ), and define A def = K(v 5 , v 6 |x 1 , x 2 ), as in the proof of Theorem 4.4 (see Figure 2 ). Our goal is to count the possible shares {v 7 , v 8 } can receive given x 1 , x 2 . We upper bound this value by considering all the possible shares {v 5 , v 6 } can receive given x 1 , x 2 (namely, the set A), and considering the union of all the sets K(v 7 , v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ) for all the vectors y 5 , y 6 in A. We first bound the size of A.
Figure 2: Sets in the proof of Theorem 4.8.
We now bound the size of K(v 3 , v 5 , v 6 |x 1 , x 2 ). Notice that
{ y 3 , y 5 , y 6 :
That is, we count all the y 3 's that coincide with x 1 , x 2 , and for each such y 3 we count all the y 5 , y 6 's that coincide with x 1 , x 2 , y 3 . Since (13) is true for any y 3 ∈ K(v 3 |x 1 , x 2 ), the size of each set in the union is at most k − 1 + (m − k + 1) 2 , and since |K(v 3 |x 1 , x 2 )| ≤ |K(v 3 )| ≤ m, there are at most m sets in the union. Therefore,
On the other hand,
{ y 3 , y 5 , y 6 : y 3 ∈ K(v 3 |x 1 , x 2 , y 5 , y 6 )} .
Since {v 1 , v 2 , v 5 , v 6 } is unauthorized, but {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 5 , v 6 } is authorized, by Lemma 3.1 each set in this union is of size at least k. Since all these sets are disjoint, and by (14) , there are at most m k (k − 1 + (m − k + 1) 2 ) sets in this union. We conclude that
In addition to x 1 , x 2 , fix an arbitrary vector x 3 , x 4 ∈ K(v 3 , v 4 |x 1 , x 2 ). We define, in addition to A, a set of vectors B def = K(v 5 , v 6 |x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ). That is, the set A is the shares {v 5 , v 6 } can receive given x 1 , x 2 , and the set B is the shares {v 5 , v 6 } can receive given x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 . Clearly B ⊆ A. To count the vectors in the set K(v 7 , v 8 |A), we define two sets v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ).
Lemma 4.6 |C|
Informally, we will show that E is small and for any y 5 , y 6 ∈ B the set E contains a large part of K(v 7 , v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ).
Since {v 3 , v 4 , v 7 } is authorized, by (4), given x 3 , x 4 any y 7 ∈ K(v 7 |x 3 , x 4 ) determines the secret, therefore
Since {v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 } is unauthorized, by (5), for any y 5 , y 6 ∈ K(v 5 , v 6 |x 3 , x 4 ), and in particular for any y 5 , y 6 ∈ B, we have |K(v 8 |x 3 , x 4 , y 5 , y 6 )| = k. Therefore, |K(v 7 , v 8 |x 3 , x 4 , y 5 , y 6 )| ≥ k for any
That is, given any y 5 , y 6 ∈ B, at least k elements from K(v 7 , v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ) are in E. We now upper bound the number of elements of K(v 7 , v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ) not in E. To do this, we bound the total number of elements in K(v 7 , v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ) for any y 5 , y 6 . Since {v 5 , v 6 , v 7 } is authorized, by (4), given y 5 , y 6 any y 7 ∈ K(v 7 |y 5 , y 6 ) determines the secret, therefore for any
With (16), we conclude that for any y 5 , y 6 ∈ B,
That is, given any y 5 , y 6 ∈ B, at most m − k elements from K(v 7 , v 8 |y 5 , y 6 ) are not in E. Thus, by (15),
Furthermore, by (17) , given any element in A \ B, the number of possible shares for {v 7 , v 8 } is at most m. Therefore,
Finally, since
and therefore
We now complete the proof of the lemma.
The first inequality follows (19) and (20) . The equality is implied by the fact that B ⊆ A. The last inequality follows (21) and Lemma 4.5. 2
Lemma 4.7 For every
The vector x 1 , x 2 , y 7 , y 8 can be extended to a vector x 1 , x 2 , y 5 , y 6 , y 7 ,
This vector can be restricted to a vector y 5 , y 6 , y 7 , y 8 ∈ K(v 5 , v 6 , v 7 , v 8 ), with y 5 , y 6 ∈ K(v 5 , v 6 |x 1 , x 2 ) = A, and so y 7 , y 8 ∈ K(v 7 , v 8 |A). Consequently,
We are now ready to prove the main result:
Theorem 4.8 For any 0 < λ < 1 there exists k 0 ∈ N, such that for any secret sharing scheme realizing V 8 , with the domain of the secret of size k > k 0 , the size of at least one share domain is larger then k + λ √ k.
Proof: Let 0 < λ < 1, and assume
in any secret sharing scheme realizing V 8 . Combining this with Lemma 4.7, we have that if m is an upper bound on the size of the domain of the shares, then the following inequality must hold:
Since the left side of Inequality (22) increases as m increases, and since m ≤ k + λ √ k, we can substitute m with k + λ √ k. After rearranging we have:
where
k 2 = 0, we conclude that there exists some k 0 ∈ N, such that for any k ≥ k 0 , Inequality (22) does not hold. We conclude that for any k ≥ k 0 , at least one participant must have domain of shares larger than k + λ √ k. 2
Upper and Lower Bounds for Matroid Induced Access Structures
In this section we rephrase the concept of secret sharing scheme in terms of the entropy function, as done in [28, 15] , and then use some tools from information theory to prove lower and upper bounds on sizes of shares' domains of subsets of participants in matroid induced access structures. The purpose of these lemmas is to generalize Lemma 2.17 of [13] to non-ideal secret sharing schemes for matroid induced access structures. These lemmas were not used in the proof of Theorem 4.8, but they might be used to prove a stronger bound than the lower bound proved here. For a review on the notions from information theory that will be used here, see Appendix A.
Information Theory and Secret Sharing
We next give an equivalent definition of secret sharing scheme. This definition is similar to that of [28, 15] . Let A be an access structure on the set of participants P , and denote the dealer p 0 . Assume that Σ is a distribution scheme for A. Recall that for any participant p ∈ P , we denote by K(p) the set of all possible shares given to p, and, for a given set of participants A ⊆ P , we denote by K(A) the set of possible vectors of shares given to the participants in A. We also denote K(p 0 ) by K (thats is, K is the domain of secrets). Any probability distribution {p K (s)} s∈K on the domain of secrets, together with the scheme Σ, induces a probability distribution on K(A), for any A ⊆ P . We denote this probability distribution by {p K(A) (a)} a∈K(A) , and denote the random variable taking values in K(A) according the the probability distribution {p K(A) (a)} a∈K(A) by S A , and by S the random variable taking values in K according to the probability distribution {p K (s)} s∈K . Note that the random variable taking values in K(A ∪ B) can be written either as S A∪B or as S A S B . It should be emphasized that Definition 2.3 of secret sharing scheme does not assume any distribution on the secrets. Here, we assume such distribution, and the results are stated in terms of the entropy of the secret, which is imposed by this distribution.
We can now restate the conditions of correctness and privacy according to the new definitions. Using Bayes' theorem, it can be shown that this restatement is equivalent to Definition 2.3. PRIVACY. If A / ∈ A, then for all s ∈ K and for all a ∈ K(A) with p K(A) (a) > 0, it holds that
From the properties of the entropy function, the conditions in Lemma 5.2 are equivalent to the conditions in Lemma 5.1.
Lemma 5.2 A distribution scheme is a secret-sharing scheme realizing an access structure A (according to Definition 2.3) if and only if the following conditions hold.

CORRECTNESS. For every A ∈ A,
PRIVACY. For every A / ∈ A,
Blundo et al. [11] showed that it is enough to show privacy of a given secret sharing scheme for uniform distribution of the secret, and that if such a scheme is private, then it is private for any distribution on the secrets.
Lower Bounds on the Entropy of Shares of Subsets
Let M = V, C be a connected matroid, p 0 ∈ V and A be the induced access structure of M with respect to p 0 , and let Σ be a secret sharing scheme realizing A. As discussed above, any probability distribution on K, induces a probability distribution on the shares of the subsets of V . We now prove some lemmas concerning these variables.
In Theorem 5.5, we prove a lower bound on the entropy of any independent subset of V . To prove Theorem 5.5 we prove two lemmas. The first lemma, which generalizes Lemma 3.1, makes no use of the fact that A has an appropriate matroid; it is proven for any access structure.
Lemma 5.3 Let
Proof:
(from (33) and (24), and because A ∪ B \ {b} / ∈ A)
2
A consequence of this lemma is that if I ⊆ A for a minterm A and i ∈ I, then H(S i |S I\{i} ) ≥ H(S). Combining this with (34), we get by induction that H(S I ) ≥ |I|H(S). We now generalize this claim for every independent set (which is not necessarily contained in a minterm). We next prove a lemma on matroids that will be used to prove this generalization. The next lemma, intuitively, states that in every independent set of participants there is a participant that is needed in order to reveal the secret. That is, there is a minterm (minimal authorized set) such that omitting this participant from the union of the independent set and the minterm results in an unauthorized set. Define C 0 def = {C ∈ C : p 0 ∈ C}.
Lemma 5.4
For every independent set I ⊆ V \ {p 0 }, there exists i ∈ I and C ∈ C 0 such that i ∈ C and there is no C 1 ∈ C 0 such that C 1 ⊆ C ∪ I \ {i}.
Proof: For every i ∈ I there exists a circuit C ∈ C 0 such that i ∈ C (since M is connected). Choose an i ∈ I and C ∈ C 0 such that i ∈ C and for every C ′ ∈ C 0
(Note that not necessarily every i can be chosen.) We claim that such i and C satisfy the conditions of the lemma, namely, there is no C 1 ∈ C 0 such that C 1 ⊆ C ∪ I \ {i}. Assume towards contradiction that this is not the case, and choose C 1 ∈ C 0 such that
We have C 1 ∩ I = ∅, otherwise C 1 C in a contradiction to Axiom (C1) of the matroids. Therefore, by (25) and (26), C \ I = C 1 \ I. Let c ∈ C \ I = C 1 \ I. Such c exists, otherwise we have C 1 ⊆ I and so I is not independent. Since c ∈ C ∩ C 1 , by Axiom (C2) there exists a circuit C 2 ⊆ C ∪ C 1 \ {c}. We have C 2 ∩ I = ∅ (otherwise C 2 C), and so p 0 / ∈ C 2 (otherwise we have a contradiction to (25)), and so p 0 ∈ C \ C 2 . Moreover, C 2 \ I = ∅, otherwise C 2 ⊆ I contradicting the independence of I. So there exists c ′ ∈ C 2 \ I, where c ′ = c. Since C 2 \ I ⊆ C \ I we have that c ′ ∈ C \ I, so c ′ ∈ C 2 ∩ C, and therefore there is a circuit C 3 ∈ C 0 such that C 3 ⊆ C 2 ∪ C \ {c ′ } (from Lemma 2.10). Since c ′ ∈ C \ C 3 , we have C 3 \ I C \ I. Moreover C 3 ∩ I = ∅ (otherwise C 3 C), and therefore C 3 is a contradiction to the minimality of C \ I (defined in (25)), so C and i satisfy the conditions of the lemma. 2
Theorem 5.5 For every
Proof: From the definition of the rank function and (34), it suffices to show that the statement holds for any independent set I ⊆ V . Since every subset of an independent set in a matroid is independent, by induction, it is sufficient to show that for every independent set I there exists i ∈ I such that H(S I ) ≥ H(S)+H(S I\{i} ). If p 0 ∈ I, then, since I is independent, it contains no circuit, and, in particular, contains no circuit which contains p 0 . Therefore, I \ {p 0 } contains no minterm, i.e., I \ {p 0 } / ∈ A. Now, by (24) , H(S|S I\{p 0 } ) = H(S), and
Otherwise, by Lemma 5.4, for every independent set I ⊆ V \ {p 0 }, there exists i ∈ I and C ∈ C 0 such that i ∈ C and there is no C 1 ∈ C 0 such that C 1 ⊆ C ∪ I \ {i}. Therefore, we have I ∪ C \ {i, p 0 } / ∈ A, but I ∪ C \ {p 0 } ∈ A, and so, by Lemma 5.3, H(S i |S I\{i} ) ≥ H(S) and 
Upper Bounds on the Entropy of Shares of Subsets
In Lemma 5.9, we prove an upper bound on the entropy of "the last element of a circuit," that is, we prove an upper bound on the entropy of an element in a circuit, given the rest of the elements (assuming an upper bound on the entropy of the participants). This enables us to prove, in Theorem 5.10, upper bounds on the entropy of shares of subsets.
Assume M and Σ as above, and in addition, for every
Lemma 5.6 For every C ∈ C 0 and c ∈ C, H(S c |S C\{c} ) ≤ λH(S).
Proof: If c = p 0 , then C \ {c} ∈ A and therefore from (23) we get H(S c |S C\{c} ) = 0. Otherwise, from (24) and (23),
On the other hand, by (37) ,
Therefore, by (27) and (28),
= λH(S).
2
Lemma 5.7 For every C ∈ C \ C 0 and c ∈ C, there exists
12).
Proof: From Lemma 2.12 there are
, there must be some C 3 ∈ C 0 such that
, and, so, c ∈ C 1 \ C 3 . We now prove that C = D p 0 (C 1 , C 3 ) and this completes the proof. Notice that
. By Lemma 2.12, the circuits which do not contain p 0 are the minimal sets of the form
Proof: As in Theorem 5.5, it is sufficient to prove that for every
In particular, for every C ∈ C \ C 0 and c ∈ C,
where n is the number of participants (that is, n = |V | − 1).
Example 5.11 Consider a secret sharing scheme realizing the Vamos access structure V 8 . Recall that the set {v 1 , v 2 , v 5 , v 6 } is a circuit of the Vamos matroid. By Theorem 5.10, H(S {v 1 ,v 2 ,v 5 ,v 6 } ) ≤ (3 + 10λ)H(S) (by using Lemma 5.9 we can get a better dependence of λ). Since {v 1 , v 2 } is independent, by Theorem 5.5,
Thus, there is a vector of shares x 1 , x 2 such that
Now, we consider a specific setting of the parameters. Let us assume that there are k possible secrets distributed uniformly, and the size of the domain of shares of each participant is at most 2k. Thus, H(S) = log k and, by (32) , H(S v i ) ≤ log(2k) = H(S) + 1 = (1 + 1/ log k)H(S). Thus, there is a vector of shares x 1 , x 2 such that H S {v 5 ,v 6 } |S {v 1 ,v 2 } = x 1 , x 2 ≤ (1 + 10/ log k)H(S).
This should be compared to the bound of approximately 2H(S) we can achieve by Lemma 4.5 and (32) . Notice that in the proof of our main result we prove in Lemma 4.5 an upper bound on the number of possible shares of {v 5 , v 6 } given a vector of shares x 1 , x 2 of {v 1 , v 2 }. Here we give a better upper-bound on the entropy of the shares of {v 5 , v 6 } given a vector of shares x 1 , x 2 of {v 1 , v 2 }. We do not know how to use this better bound on the entropy in the proof of the lower bound for the Vamos access structure.
An Access Structure that is Nearly Ideal
We next present an example of a non-ideal access structure induced by a matroid, which is nearly ideal: for infinitely many values of k it has a secret sharing scheme realizing it with domain of secrets of size k and domain of shares of size k + 1. This implies that the definition used in [32, 30, 35] for ideal schemes is not equivalent to the more common definition of ideal schemes used implicitly in [13] and explicitly in [33, 1, 37, 38, 3] and in this work. The access structure F has an appropriate matroid, namely the Fano matroid, and the access structure F also has an appropriate matroid, namely the nonFano matroid (see, e.g., [1, Example 4.2]). The next observation follows since F and F have appropriate matroids.
Observation 6.2
The access structure F ∧ F has an appropriate matroid.
The observation also follows from Claim 6.4 (showing that there is a secret sharing scheme realizing F ∧ F in which the size of the domain of shares of each participant is at most k + 1) and the result of [31] (showing that in every secret sharing scheme realizing an access structure that does not have an appropriate matroid the size of the domain of shares of at least one participant is k 1.5 ).
Using a result of [34] , it is easy to show that the access structure F ∧ F is not ideal.
Claim 6.3 The access structure F ∧ F is not ideal.
Proof: Matúš [34] proves that for odd k, the access structure F does not have an ideal scheme with domain of secrets of size k, and for even k, the access structure F does not have an ideal scheme with domain of secrets of size k. If F ∧ F has an ideal secret sharing scheme with domain of secrets of size k for some k, then, both F and F have an ideal secret sharing scheme with domain of secrets of size k. But this is impossible by the result of [34] . 2
Using known schemes and the representation of the appropriate matroids, there is a "nearly" ideal secret sharing schemes realizing F ∧ F . Proof sketch: Since every minimal authorized subset of F ∧ F is a union of two minimal authorized subsets of F and F, we can use a known paradigm to construct a scheme realizing F ∧ F: Let K = 0, . . . , 2 i − 1 be the domain of secrets. The dealer chooses a random integer r ∈ K, and independently shares r among the participants {a , . . . , a 6 }, and r ⊕ s among the participants {b 1 , . . . , b 6 }.
To complete the description of the scheme, we need to explain how to construct secret sharing schemes realizing F and F with domain of secrets of size 2 i and domain of shares of size at most 2 i +1. Brickell [12] proved that if an access structure has an appropriate matroid representable over a finite field with k elements, then it has an ideal secret sharing scheme with domain of secrets of size k. Since the Fano matroid is representable over every field of characteristic 2, for every i ∈ N, there is an ideal scheme realizing F with domain of secrets of size 2 i . Since the nonFano matroid is representable over every field whose characteristic is not 2, for every odd prime p there is an ideal scheme realizing F with domain of secrets of size p. Furthermore, by [14] , if an access structure has ideal schemes with domain of secrets of size q 1 and q 2 , then it has an ideal scheme with domain of secrets of size q 1 · q 2 . Thus, there is an ideal scheme realizing F with domain of secrets of size k for every odd k. Now using the ideal scheme with k = 2 i + 1, there is a scheme realizing F with domain of secrets of size 2 i and domain of shares of size 2 i + 1.
2
The definition of ideal access structure that appears in [32, 30, 35] states that an access structure is ideal if the infimum of the ratio between the log of the size of the shares' domain and the log of the size of the secret's domain is 1. This is the case in F ∧ F , thus it is ideal according to this definition, while it is non-ideal according to the definition that appears in this paper.
